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Abstract 
Consider a divisible resource or cost that is to be fairly distributed among a group, 
and suppose that various members of the group have different opinions about what a 
fair distribution might be. We exhibit a class of mechanisms that aggregate individual 
opinions into a group opinion, and which have the property that no one can manipulate the 
size of his own share. There is a unique such mechanism that satisfies a variant of Arrow's 
conditions for social choice functions. We illustrate its application to  distributing dues 
among the member countries of IIASA. Other potential applications include distributing 
shares in formerly state-owned enterprises, and in allocating voting power among different 
states or regions in a federal system of government. 
Social Justice and Individual Choice 
1. The eve of the beholder 
Fairness is an everyday concern in economic and political life. Scarcely any discussion of 
public policy occurs without the term being used by some or all parties to the debate. Yet 
for many people fairness remains a disturbingly vague and inchoate concept. Some think 
that fairness is a mere fig-leaf that disguises arguments based on naked self-interest. 
Others, while not going quite so far, hold that fairness is largely a matter of opinion and 
therefore nothing interesting can be said about it. Yet neither of these positions is very 
credible. The first is not logically coherent, because a word that is used only as a cover 
ceases to be one; it becomes transparent and therefore ineffectual. The second argument -- 
that fairness is merely a matter of opinion -- cuts little mustard because it applies with equal 
force to the other tools we use to analyze individual choice. One might just as well dismiss 
attitudes toward risk, marginal rates of substitution, and the propensity to save as merely 
matters of opinion and therefore of no intrinsic interest. Yet they form the backbone of 
economic theory. Why, then, do opinions about fairness not have equal standing? 
Part of the reason is that we do not yet have an accepted empirical framework for assessing 
attitudes toward fairness with the same confidence that we measure, say, attitudes toward 
risk. And part of the reason is that debates about fairness have traditionally been the 
province of philosophers, for whom fairness is anything but a matter of opinion, but a 
question of high moral principle. If philosophers had produced a convincing recipe for 
fairness we would need to go no further, but instead they offer a menu of competing 
definitions that have radically different policy implications. Egalitarians maintain that goods 
should be divided equally, Aristotelians that they should be allotted in proportion to each 
person's contribution, Rawlsians that they should go to the least well-off, utilitarians that 
they should be given to those who would benefit most at the margin, anti-invidians that 
they should be distributed so that no one envies another, and so forth. Clearly this 
presents a dilemma for anyone who wants to incorporate distributive considerations into 
questions of public policy. 
It is of course true that in certain cases one of these principles may be particularly 
compelling. If a group of people invest in a joint enterprise, for example, it is natural to 
follow the Aristotelian principle and divide the profits in proportion to the investors' 
contributions. If a company of soldiers receives an allotment of food they will probably 
adopt the egalitarian principle. If there is only enough flu vaccine for one shot it would 
probably be given to the person who is most at risk.' 
There are many situations, however, in which it is unclear what principle applies. Take the 
current economic reform in Russia and Eastern Europe. A key step in the transition to 
market economies is to privatize state enterprises and to distribute ownership rights among 
individuals. But exactly who is entitled to these rights and what is the extent of their 
entitlement? The Aristotelian theory suggests that the shares should be allotted in proportion 
to individual contributions. The question then becomes how to measure a person's 
contribution. Is it his contribution to a particular enterprise? If so, one might divide the 
shares among the enterprise's current (and former) employees according to the length of 
their employment, or perhaps to their total earnings during employment. Alternatively, one 
could argue that everyone contributed to the enterprise through state subsidies that were 
funded over the years by taxes. On this view an individual's share would be larger the 
more taxes he paid. Similar, if not more perplexing, difficulties arise in applying the 
Rawlsian and utilitarian principles. Even the egalitarian principle is ambiguous. Should 
equality hold for all residents or only citizens? For all citizens or only adult citizens? 
Difficulties like these lead us back to the proposition that fairness is, at least in some cases, 
mainly a matter of opinion. It does not follow, however, that these opinions do not matter. 
When common property or a collective burden is to be distributed among a group, the 
stakeholders will often have strongly-held views about the justice or injustice of different 
distributions. By just I do not necessarily mean ethical or moral, but that which the parties 
believe to be appropriate under a given set of circumstances. Sometimes opinions about 
"appropriateness" flow from a sense of moral imperative; more often they are simply 
opinions based on intuition and experience, but this does not make them any the less 
interesting or important. 
In this paper we propose a method for assessing opinions about distributive justice that is 
in the pluralistic spirit that animates the modem theory of social choice. We accept from the 
outset that people may have different views about what a fair distribution ought to be. 
These views are taken as given, and our task is to find a process that aggregates them into a 
group opinion. Of course, this pushes the fairness issue onto a higher plane -- the design of 
fair process. We shall argue, however, that it is often easier to achieve consensus on fair 
procedural principles than to bargain over particular distributions. 
' These cases illustrate three general distribaive principles -- proponionality, puity, and pnority -- that figure in 
almost all discussions of distributive justice (Young. 1994). 
Specifically, we propose to construct an aggregation procedure with the following four 
properties: i) everyone's opinion counts equally; ii) individuals have no incentive to 
misreport their opinions in order to manipulate their own shares; iii) the size of a person's 
share depends only on data that are relevant to that person; iv) if there is unanimous support 
for a particular ratio between two individuals, then this ratio is implemented. These 
conditions are deliberately modelled on standard axioms in the social choice literature 
(including Arrow's axioms) in order to illustrate that fair division can be approached with 
the familiar tools of social choice theory. Unlike many such axiom schemes, however, 
they yield positive results. We shall show, in fact, that there exists a unique aggregation 
method with these four properties, and then illustrate its application to a situation with real 
data. 
2. The model 
Consider a group of n individuals i = 1, 2, . . . , n who are to divide a common asset, 
which we assume is perfectly divisible. The individuals may have various distinguishing 
characteristics -- need, income, age, prior contribution, etc. -- that entitle them to more or 
less of the good. They may also have different views about how these characteristics 
translate into specific entitlements to the good. Whether these differences result from 
distinct philosophical positions about fairness is unimportant for our purposes. In other 
words, we shall not inquire into the reasons that they hold the opinions they do any more 
than we ask for the reasons why they are risk averse. We do recognize, however, that a 
person's opinion about the proper size of his own share may be dictated largely by self- 
interest. For this reason we shall be concerned mainly with how much people think the 
others should get, not how much they themselves should get.2 
Formally, the opinion of individual i is a vector of nonnegative numbers r*ij, 1 S j S n, 
that sum to one. These are the relative amounts that i believes everyone should receive. 
The opinion is nondegenerate if i believes the others are entitled to something, that is, 
r*.. > 0 for some j + i. We shall assume throughout that all opinions are nondegenerate. 
'J 
A partial report by individual i is a vector ri = (rij)j#i that is nonnegative and not 
identically zero. These are the relative shares that i says the others should receive. The 
partial report ri is true if there is a factor Ai > 0 such that rd = Air*ij for every j # i. We can 
always normalize a partial report so that its sum is unity, and we shall assume this has been 
done for every individual. 
There is a large body of empirical work assessing intuitions of distributive justice by experimental methods 
that differ from those suggested here. See, for example, Selten (1978). Y a d  and Bar-Hillel (1982), Hoffman 
and Spitzer (1985). Roth ed. (1987), Mathieu and Zajac (1991). and Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992). 
Fix the number of individuals n and let r = (r l , r2 ,  . . ., rn) be a set of normalized partial 
reports. Assume for the moment that the reports are true. We would like to find a division 
-- a set of n shares that sum to one -- that balances the revealed differences of opinion 
among the members of the group. An aggregation method is a function F(r) defined for 
every n-vector of normalized partial reports r = ( r l ,  r2, . . ., r,), such that F(r) = (xi, x2, 
. . ., xn) 2. 0 and  EX^ = 1. 
3. Statistical solutions 
We begin by treating the problem as one of statistical inference. Suppose we knew the true 
opinion r*i of each member of the group. Let us normalize it so that it sums to unity. A 
statistician would find it natural to average the opinions and let x*j = & r*ij/n for every j. 
These shares x* = ( x * ~ ,  . . ., x * ~ )  minimize the squared deviations from the true 
opinions. 
Now suppose that we do not know the true opinions, but we have in hand a set of 
normalized partial reports (r 1, r2, . . ., rn). Suppose further that these reports are true. 
Then there exist numbers A1, A2, . . ., A n  in the interval [0, 1) such that r*ii = 
Ai, r*ij = 1 - A j ,  i .  Although we do not know the values of the hi, we can assume a 
prior distribution over them. Let us assume, for example, that the numbers Ai are 
independently and uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1). Then the relative shares 
that minimize the expected squared deviations from the true opinions are given by 
which has the solution 
Xj = (1/2n) (1 + E rij). 
i: i+j 
Equivalently, x is the normalized sum of the rows of the matrix: 
Note that each person's share is independent of his own report, so that no one has an 
incentive to manipulate his report in order to get more for himself. 
Consider the following hypothetical application. There are three claimants for shares in a 
newly privatized enterprise. Individual 1 is a manager, 2 is a laborer, and 3 is a citizen 
who is neither a manager nor a laborer. The manager thinks that the laborer should get 
twice as much as the citizen. The laborer thinks that the manager and the citizen should be 
treated alike. The citizen thinks that the laborer should get nothing. Thus they write down 
the following partial reports, where each is normalized to sum to 1: 
mgr lab cit 
mgr -- 2l3 113 
lab 112 -- 112 
cit 1 0 -- 
The solution is found by placing a " 1" in each blank, summing the entries in each column, 
and normalizing so that the total is unity. The answer is x = (15136, 10136, 11/36). 
Although this method is plausible in some ways, it has several drawbacks. In the first 
place its motivation is weak -- we have no good reason to assume a uniform prior, and we 
have even less reason to assume that the true opinions are independently distributed. 
(Indeed, there may be considerable agreement among members of the group about what the 
appropriate standard of justice is.) Even if we accept these assumptions, however, the 
outcome of the method is unsatisfactory because it is skewed toward equal division: no 
matter what the true opinions are, everyone gets at least 112n of the pie. 
Let us therefore consider a second statistical estimation approach. Instead of assuming a 
uniform prior, let us estimate the distribution of shares that comes closest to the partial 
reports, given that each report is only meaningful up to a choice of scale, and that all 
reports are to count equally. In other words, we wish to find a vector x = (XI ,  x2, . . ., 
xn) and a single positive factor A such that 
x, A minimizes Z (Z (xj - )rrij)') subject to Z xj = 1. 
j i: i#j j 
The unique solution is 
A = 1 - lln 
Xj = (l/n)E rij for all j. 
i:i+j 
This is equivalent to saying that x is the normalized sum of the rows of the matrix 
This process has the following natural interpretation: each individual is given lln of the 
total "pie" to divide among the others, and the sum of these divisions is the required 
allocation. 
Note that this method is reliable in the sense that each agent's share is independent of his 
own report. Moreover it is clear how to construct a family of such procedures. Fix a 
nonnegative number c, and for every set of n normalized partial reports 
r = ( r l ,  r2, . . ., rn), define the rule Fc such that 
The first rule that we defined is FI and the second is @. Letting c go to infinity we also 
obtain the constant method F(r) = (lln, lln, . . . , lln). 
These methods can obviously be extended to allow each agent to submit a full report about 
himself as well as the others (one just ignores what each says about himself). Define a 
report by individual i to be a vector of n numbers r i  = ( r i l ,  ri2, . . ., rin) 2 0. It is 
nondegenerate if rij > 0 for at least one j+i. In this setting a method is a function F(r) that 
associates a unique distribution x 2 0, xj = 1, with each set of n nondegenerate, normalized 
reports r = ( r l ,  r2, . . ., rn). From now on we shall treat methods in this extended sense, 
since they form a less restricted class than those that ignore agents' reports about 
themselves. 
4. A solution from first princi~les 
Fix the number of individuals n and an extended method F, and consider the following 
procedural fairness conditions. 
I. ANONYMITY. For every permutation sr of the indices 1, 2, . . ., n, and every full report 
ri, consider the report rxi = (r,(i),(l), . . ., rn(i)K(n)). F is anonymous if for every ~c 
and every r ,  
This condition says that the method should not be biased in favor of any individual. In 
particular, although the individuals may get different shares, they have equal voice in 
determining the shares. 
11. RELIABILITY. For all i and r, Fi(r) does not depend on i's report. 
111. RELEVANCE. For all i and r ,  Fi(r) does not depend on reports about individuals 
different fiom i, that is, Fi(r) is independent of rjk for all j*i and all k*i. 
Note that this condition is similar to Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives 
condition. Strictly speaking, the analog of Arrow's condition would be that any two shares 
xi, xj depend only on data concerning i and j. Since we are dealing here with cardinal 
rather than ordinal comparisons, however, we may go one step further and require that the 
share of any individual depend only on data about that individual. 
IV. UNANIMITY. For all i, j, and r, if there is a nonnegative number c such that rijlrji = 
rkj/rki = C for all k * i, j, then Fj/Fi = C. 
This condition states that if, for some pair i and j, i's reported share for j is c times as large 
as j's reported share for i, and if everyone else concurs on this ratio, then i should receive c 
times as much as j under F. This means, in particular, that if q j  = 0 for all k j  and r k  > 0 
for all k*i, then Fj/Fi = 0. 
Theorem. For every number of claimants n, FO is the unique fairness procedure that is 
anonymous, reliable, relevant, and unanimous. 
Proof. It is straightforward to check that fl satisfies all four conditions. Conversely, let 
F be a method that satisfies these conditions on some set of n respondents. Relevance 
implies that, for every j, Fj(r) is a function solely of the numbers r l j ,  r2j, . . . , rnj. 
Moreover, reliability implies that Fj(r) does not depend on rjj. In effect, then, Fj(r) is a 
function from [0, l]n-1 + [0, 11. Call this function g. From anonymity it follows that g 
is a symmetric function of its arguments, and that g represents Fi(r) for all i. 
To prove the theorem, it suffices to show that, for all y E [0, 1]n-l, g(y1,. . ., Yn-l) = 
Cykln. First consider any y 2 0 such that Cyk,= 1. Define the reports ri as follows: 
Since r is fixed by the cyclic permutation 1 + 2 +. . . . -+ n -+ 1, condition I implies that 
Fi(r) = Fj(r) for all i, j, and hence F(r) = (lln, lln, . . .,l/n). From this and condition 111 
it follows that g(y) = Cykln whenever Cyk = 1. 
Now choose y 2 0 such that Cyk = a, where 0 < a < 1. Without loss of generality we may 
assume that y l  is the largest of the values yi. Construct a matrix of reports r such that the 
first c o  1 u m n  of r is (0, y l  , y2, . . ., Yn - 1 )T and the second column is 
(l/a)(yl, 0 ,  y2, . . ., Yn-l)T. (Here T denotes "transpose".) For each i 2 2 we have 
y l  + yi I a < 1. Since yi I yl  it follows that yi < 112 for all i 2 2. From this we obtain 
Thus the remaining columns of r may be filled in such that the sum of each row equals 1. 
Let F(r) = x. Pairwise unanimity asserts that ~ 1 1 x 2  = a. Since the sum of the second 
column is unity, the preceding argument shows that x2 = lln. Thus x i  = aln. This 
establishes that g(y) = C ykln whenever 0 < Cyk < 1. If E yk = 0, then y is identically 0. 
In this case we can construct reports so that the first column is identically zero and the 
second is positive and sums to 1. Pairwise unanimity then implies that ~ 1 1 x 2  = 0, which 
,~)\.cw.F ~ ! 2 t .  X; = 0. Thuz ~ ( 2 )  = 0 ,  
Finally, consider the case where Cyk > 1. Then we can construct a matrix of reports r 
such that the first column is (0, Y ) ~ ,  each row sums to 1, and each of the remaining 
columns sums to at most 1. From the preceding argument it follows that xj = Ci rjjln for 
every j 2 2. Since C X ~  = 1 and L i j  rijln = 1, it follows that x i  = Ci rilln as was to be 
shown. Thus g(y) = Cykln in all cases, which completes the proof. 
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) is an interdisciplinary 
research organization to promote scientific cooperation between Eastern and Western 
countries. As of mid-1993, IIASA had the fourteen member countries shown in Table 1 
below. Each country contributes annual dues to support the operating budget of the institute 
according to a graduated dues schedule. Initially there were just two categories of 
countries: Russia and the United States in category I and all other countries in category 11. 
The dues ratio of the former to the latter was 6 to 1. As of June, 1993 when this study was 
undertaken there were three categories of members with the dues ratio 6 : 2 : 1. The recent 
changes in Eastern Europe and Russia have led some to question whether this scheme is 
still appropriate. 
This situation provides a natural environment in which to apply the ideas sketched above. A 
simple experiment was conducted in which a questionnaire was distributed to fourteen 
researchers at IIASA, one drawn at random from each of the member countries. The 
questionnaire presented the information in Table 1, and invited the respondents to state their 
opinion about what they think the fairest ratio of payments would be for each of the 
thirteen countries other than their own. The results are presented in Table 2. The last line of 
the table gives the shares (in percent) according to the method @. 
Country Current Dues Ratio Pop (la) GDP Per Cap ($1 
Austria 2 
Bulgaria 1 
Canada 2 
Czechoslovakia 1 
Finland 2 
Germany 2 
Hungary 1 
Italy 2 
Japan 2 
Netherlands 1 
Poland 1 
Russia 6 
Sweden 2 
USA 6 
Table 1. The fourteen member countries of IIASA as of July, 1993. Per capita GDP estimates for 
Eastern Europe and Russia (including the Ukraine) are from Comecon Data 1990 (Vienna Institute for 
Comparative Economic Studies, p. 48). The figures for Germany combine separate estimates for East and West 
Germany. 
Table 2. Reported fair shares by respondents from each of the fourteen 
member countries, and the computed fair shares (in percent) using method 
fl. Each row is a report by a respondent from the country that is indicated by a dash. 
Several features of these responses are worth noting. First, there was a considerable 
amount of agreement among the respondents even though no two opinions were the same. 
For example, everyone except the Swedish respondent said that Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, and Poland should pay the same amount (or they reported no opinion). 
Similarly, ten of the respondents thought that the US should pay six times the amount paid 
by the smallest dues-payer (as it does now). Moreover, the Swede's estimate, which was 
based on a formula weighting population and GDP, yielded almost the same ratio 
(4.51.7 = 6.4).3 
Second, it appears that precedent (i.e., the current dues ratios) weighed fairly heavily in the 
respondents' opinions. But while most respondents thought that the current shares were 
about right, none of them thought they were exactly right. For example, no one thought 
that Russia should continue to pay three times the amount that Japan does. (In fact all but 
two people who evaluated both countries thought that Japan should pay as much or more 
than Russia.) Similarly, of those who evaluated both Russia and the U.S., only three 
thought that they should continue to pay equal amounts. And no one thought that Italy 
should continue to pay at the same rate as Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. 
A third interesting feature of the data is that all but one respondent (the Swede) gave 
answers in small whole numbers. In effect everyone except the Swede divided the 
countries into between two and five equivalence classes of dues-payers. This is not to say 
that the respondents ignored differences in population and GDP; the written comments 
accompanying their answers show that they did. Most, however, preferred to round the 
results instead of drawing fine distinctions. Of course, the existing dues structure 
encouraged this approach. It appears, however, that most respondents felt uncomfortable 
with a weighting scheme that appears to be very precise, even though in fact it is based on 
estimates of GDP and population that are subject to considerable error, and that in any 
event are proxies for more elusive concepts like ability to pay. 
6. Class constraints 
The grouping of stakeholders into equivalence classes is quite common in problems of this 
type. Indeed for practical reasons this may be necessary when the number of stakeholders 
is large. In distributing shares from state enterprises, for example, it seems natural to 
declare in advance that all laborers are to be treated alike, all managers alike, and all citizens 
The Swedish respondent proposed that the ratios be in proportion to the following criterion: 
(populationlmaximum population) + (GDP per capita/rnaxirnum GDP per capita). 
alike. The issue then becomes what the appropriate ratio should be between a 
representative laborer, a representative citizen, and a representative manager. The scheme 
developed above is easily adapted to this case. Let there be m equivalence classes C1, C2, 
. . ., Cm, and let nj be the number of individuals in the jth class. Let n = Z j  denote the 
total number of individuals. It is given that all members of the same class must receive 
equal shares. The method @ may then be modified as follows. First, each individual 
states the relative shares that should hold between representative individuals in the other 
classes. Thus a partial report of individual i is a vector ri of m - 1 numbers rij, where j 
ranges over all classes that do not contain i. The numbers rij : rik represent the proportions 
that i believes should hold between each member of class j and each member of class k. A 
solution is an m-vector x t 0 such that xj is the share of each individual in class j and 
Zn-x  = 1. Given n partial reports ri (i = 1, 2, . . ., n) the process @ chooses the unique J J 
x E Rm such that 
Concretely, we give l/n of the pie to each individual, who then divides it among the n - 1 
remaining individuals szhject to the constraint that all members of the same class must 
receive equal shares in his division. 
To illustrate, consider the following variant of the first example. There is one manager, 
two laborers, and three citizens. Every citizen thinks the proper ratio for a manager and a 
laborer is 1 : 0, every laborer thinks the proper ratio for a manager and a citizen is 1 : 1, and 
the manager thinks the proper ratio for a laborer and a citizen is 2 : 1.4 
In general, individuals in a given class will have different opinions, but this presents no real complications. 
13  
Normalizing so that each report sums to one, we obtain the matrix: 
mgr lab1 lab2 citl cit2 cit3 
mgr * U7 U7 117 117 117 
lab 1 114 * * 314 314 314 
lab2 114 * * 314 314 314 
cit 1 1 0 0 * * * 
cit2 1 0 0 * * * 
cit3 1 0 0 * * * 
The row average yields the relative shares $(r) = (49184, 4184, 9184) for manager, 
laborer, and citizen respectively. 
7. Conclusion 
We conclude by suggesting several other applications of this approach. Suppose, for 
example, that a person dies without leaving a will. Ordinarily the probate court would 
distribute the estate among the surviving spouse and children according to ratios specified 
in the law. If for some reason there were no applicable law, however, then the heirs might 
determine a fair solution using the method FO described above. Or they might try to 
negotiate a solution, knowing that if they failed to agree they would resort to this 
procedure. 
As a second example, consider a village that receives a shipment of grain to ward off 
famine. Different classes of villagers -- children, the elderly, pregnant women, etc. -- might 
be thought to deserve different amounts. The traditional way of solving such problems is to 
have an authority figure such as the chief of the tribe divide it, and in a traditional society 
this might well be considered fair. A more democratic approach, however, would be to 
employ a method like that described above, using the expressed opinions of the villagers as 
inputs. 
A third potential application is to the design of constitutional conventions. Suppose that a 
group of n states plans to form a federation with a single legislature. The states differ in 
population and perhaps in other ways that call for giving them different numbers of 
representatives in the new confederation. The precise division of seats will be one of the 
issues decided in the constitutional convention. This raises the perplexing question of how 
many delegates each state gets to send. If each sends the same number, and they vote by 
majority, the outcome will probably be biased in favor of equal division. This might be 
regarded as unfair if the states are very different in size. 
The preceding analysis shows how this difficulty may be surmounted. Let each state send 
an equal number of delegates, and let each delegate specify a fair ratio of representation for 
the other states. Thus the pie is the number of seats in the legislature, and the delegates give 
their opinions about the relative number of seats that each of the other states should receive. 
The outcome using the method FO is a ratio of representation between the various states. 
The actual distribution of seats is determined by a choosing a total number of seats, and 
allocating them in proportion to the shares according to some standard apportionment 
formula like Webster's method (Balinski and Young, 1982). In this way one avoids the 
circularity problem that results when the distribution of seats in the convention influences 
the distribution of seats in the legislature itself. 
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